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ABSTRACT
Optimizing energy consumption and end-to-end (e2e) packet delay
in energy constrained distributed wireless networks is a conflict-
ing multi-objective optimization problem. This paper investigates
this trade-off from a game-theoretic perspective, where the two op-
timization objectives are considered as virtual game players that
attempt to optimize their utility values. The cost model of each
player is mapped through a generalized optimization framework
onto protocol specific MAC parameters. A cooperative game is
then defined, in which the Nash Bargaining solution assures the
balance between energy consumption and e2e packet delay. For il-
lustration, this formulation is applied to three state-of-the-art wire-
less sensor network MAC protocols; X-MAC, DMAC, and LMAC
as representatives of preamble sampling, slotted contention-based,
and frame-based MAC categories, respectively. The paper shows
the effectiveness of such framework in optimizing protocol param-
eters for achieving a fair energy-delay performance trade-off, under
the application requirements in terms of initial energy budget and
maximum e2e packet delay. The proposed framework is scalable
with the increase in the number of nodes, as the players represent
the optimization metrics instead of nodes.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
C.2.2 [Network Protocols]; C.2.4 [Distributed System]; G.1.6 [Mathematics
of computing]: Optimization—Convex programming
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Wireless Networks; Game Theory; Duty-Cycling; MAC; Energy; Delay.
1. INTRODUCTION
Maximizing the network lifetime while assuring the application require-
ments in terms of e2e delay is challenging in distributed energy-constrained
wireless networks, such as wireless sensor networks (WSN). Energy saving
is achieved at the MAC protocol by duty-cycling the radio, which necessi-
tates multiple operational cycles in forwarding data packets. This mecha-
.
nism can violate the e2e delay bound required in multi-hop networks. Given
the application constraints in terms of initial energy budget devoted to each
individual node and the maximum e2e packet delay tolerated, the choice of
MAC protocol’s parameters is of great importance; yet their choice is cur-
rently done by system designers based on repeated real experiences [2], or
on optimizing one objective subject to other objectives as constraints [12].
These solutions achieve the optimal running performance for one objective
that is not necessarily optimal for the other, which yields a performance far
off the application requirements.
Contribution: We investigate the inherent trade-off between the two
metrics from a game-theoretic perspective. We propose a game-theory
framework that permits to determine optimal values for tunable MAC pa-
rameters to achieve a fair energy-delay trade-off for design considerations.
These tunable parameters, related to application sampling and MAC duty-
cycle operations, allow to find an equilibrium point in which the system
operates. In the proposed framework, the virtual players are the perfor-
mance metrics (energy and delay), instead of the individual nodes that is
common in the state-of-the-art models. The cost model of each player is
then mapped onto a protocol specific MAC parameters that are system wide
optimal. The following steps are followed in order to find the optimal oper-
ation that balances energy consumption and latency: (i) Energy and Latency
are characterized in duty-cycle MAC protocols according to sampling rate
and duty-cycle operation parameters. (ii) Energy consumption optimization
is achieved by deriving optimal parameters that minimize energy consump-
tion subject to latency constraints. (iii) Latency optimization is achieved
by deriving optimal parameters that minimize latency subject to to energy
budget constraints. Finally, (iv) a Nash Bargaining solution model is used
to find a cooperative optimal point between players that represent energy
consumption and latency.
Related Work: While most of the energy-efficient MAC protocols for
wireless networks followed pure experimental approaches, some works have
attempted to model and analyze these protocols. Langendoen and Meier, [3]
consider traffic and network models for very low data rate applications, and
they analyze energy consumption and average latency of well known MAC
protocols. Protocol optimization have been investigated by Ye et al. [10],
notably for energy minimization of SCP-MAC protocol. While most mod-
els consider single- objective optimization, protocol optimization under ap-
plication needs in terms of both energy and e2e delay have been considered
in [12]. However, their approaches are based on optimizing energy subject
to constraints on the delay. Lately, numerous efforts have been devoted to
address MAC optimization in wireless networks using game theory. First,
Nuggehalli et al [7] use game-theory to address the QoS support in 802.11
networks that enables users with high-priority or low-priority traffic to fairly
negotiate channel access. Energy-efficiency is also addressed by Voulkidis
et al. [9], using game-theory-based coalition formation between spatial cor-
related sensors to reduce the amount of transmitted packets. The energy-
delay tradeoff is considered by Nahir et al, [5], where multiple cost models
(power level, direct/indirect transmissions) are used by each node to deter-
mine the Nash equilibrium point. All these works consider nodes as players
in the game and attempt to maximize the defined utility function. These ap-
proaches lack of scalability and do not apply to large networks. Last but not
the least, Zhao et al. [11] propose a game-theoretical solution to achieve a
trade-off between load-balancing and energy-efficiency in traffic engineer-
ing, where the performance goals are considered as peers (players) of the
game. The proposed framework is based on the energy model derived in [3],
and it uses of the Nash Bargaining solution to balance objectives modeled
as virtual players, which is inspired by the model proposed in [11]. To the
best of our knowledge, this work is the first that considers the energy/delay
trade-off in duty-cycled MAC protocols using game-theory.
2. GAME THEORY FRAMEWORK
In the proposed framework, the key performance metrics are the en-
ergy consumption E and the maximum end-to-end (e2e) packet delay L.
The application requirements expressed as the maximum energy budget
per node, Ebudget, and the maximum allowed end-to-end delay per node,
Lmax, are used as inputs for the framework. The framework builds then a
system-wide model for energy and delay based on, (i) the specified MAC
model defined by its operating modes: idle, transmission, reception, and
sleep modes, and (ii), the network and traffic models that permit to deter-
mine the topology information and the traffic load at each node.
Energy Consumption, En, is defined as the amount of energy con-
sumed by the radio of node, n ∈ V (V a set of nodes in the network),
according to its position and the amount of traffic it handles. Thus, the
Energy Consumption depends on node density and data sampling rate. It
is calculated as a function of the operating modes the sensor node runs,
and the MAC intrinsic parameters. In general, the energy consumed in any
MAC protocol is due to: carrier sensing Ecs, data transmission Etx, data
reception Erx, overhearing Eovr , and sending/receiving synchronization
frames (resp. Estx and Esrx) in the case of synchronous protocols. Given
that the network lifetime can be expressed as the expected shortest node-
lifetime [12], we define the system wide Energy Consumption, E, as the
maximum consumed energy in the network,
E = max
n∈V
(
En = Encs + E
n
tx + E
n
rx + E
n
ovr + E
n
stx + E
n
srx
)
End-to-end (e2e) Delay, Ln, is defined as the expected time between
the first transmission of a packet at node, n ∈ V , and its reception at the
sink. It is then a per-topology parameter, in the sense that it depends on the
position of the node that generates the data. Ln denotes the sum of per-hop
latencies of the shortest path Pn from node n to the sink, where Lnl is the
one-hop latency on link l ∈ Pn. The maximum end-to-end latency, L, is
defined as the maximum latency from all nodes to the sink as follows:
L = max
n∈V
(
Ln =
∑
l∈Pn
Lnl
)
Network and Traffic Model. Let us consider an unsaturated network
with low traffic, which is typical in energy-constrained networks, e.g., WSN
applications. For the sake of simplicity, a ring topology is adopted following
the same analysis as in [3]. A spanning tree is constructed, where nodes are
static and maintain a unique path to the sink and use the shortest path routing
with a maximum length of D hops; the depth or number of rings of the tree.
Assume a network with uniform node density on the plane, and a unit disk
graph communication model with density, C, i.e., unit disks contain C+1
nodes. The nodes are layered into levels according to their distance to the
static sink in terms of minimal hop count, d (d=1,...,D), where d =0 is
reserved for the sink. Periodic traffic generation is considered, where every
source node generates traffic with frequency Fs. Consequently, the same
input F dI , output F
d
out, background F
d
B traffic and input links I
d equations
for every node are similar to those derived in [3].
Eenrgy-Delay Optimization. Let Θ denote the set of parameters that
can be optimized in the system for a given application. Given a specific
MAC protocol, let X ∈ Θ be the vector of system parameters that can
be optimized. The following optimization problems are defined for energy
consumption and e2e delay minimization:
(P1) (P2)
Minimize E
(
X
)
Minimize L
(
X
)
S.t. L(X) 6 Lmax S.t. E(X) 6 Ebudget
Var. X , Var. X ,
The pairs (Ebest, Lworst) and (Eworst, Lbest) are the optimal solu-
tions of problems (P1) and (P2) respectively, where, Ebest=E(X∗E)
and Lworst=L(X∗E), while Eworst=E(X
∗
L) and Lbest=L(X
∗
L).
Nash Bargaining Solution. In order to find the optimal trade-off, we
use the Nash Bargaining solution where every optimization problem repre-
sents a player, i.e., player Energy and player Latency. A bargaining game
with two players selects one of the possible player’s outcomes of a joint
collaboration [6]. Let A ∈ R2 be the set of alternatives the players face,
S={s = (u1(a), u2(a))|a ∈ A} be the set of feasible utility payoffs u,
and v ∈ S be a disagreement or threat point. Each point in S corresponds
to the outcome of the bargaining and specifies the utility for this outcome.
The disagreement point, v = (v1, v2), represents the value that each player
expects to receive if the negotiation breaks down. The goal of the bargain-
ing is to choose a feasible agreement Φ : (S, v) → S that results from
the negotiation. The Nash Bargaining solution considers that S is convex,
compact, and there exists an s∈S such that, s>v for both players. Players
have complete information over S, v. The Nash Bargaining solution deals
with the bargaining game by solving optimization problem (NBS):
(NBS) (P3)
Maximize
(
s1 − v1
)(
s2 − v2
)
Maximize
(
Eworst-E
)(
Lworst-L
)
S.t. s ∈ S S.t. (Ebudget, Lmax) ≥ (E,L)(
s1, s2
) ≥ (v1, v2) (Eworst, Lworst) ≥ (E,L)
Var. s, Var. E,L,
The Nash Bargaining solution has the following axioms, [6], (i) Pareto
Optimality, (ii) Symmetry, (iii) Scale Independence, and (iv) Independence
of Irrelevant Alternatives. It specifies that there exists an optimal solution
since S is compact, the objective function is continuous. The uniqueness
of the optimal solution is guaranteed when the objective function is quasi-
concave. The Nash Bargaining solution Φ(S, v) is the unique bargaining
solution that satisfies the previous four axioms. Let X∗E and X
∗
L be the
point values obtained by both players, Energy and Delay, if the agreement
for problems (P1) and (P2) fails. Noting thatE andL are cost functions
instead of utility functions, and that the pair (Ebest, Lbest) is an infeasible
solution in both problems (P1) and (P2). The Nash Bargaining Solution
to the Duty-Cycled MAC problem is given by problem (P3). Each player
can prevent the agreement threatening with his best value and the other’s
worst value, or it can reduce its threat, looking for a feasible point that
satisfies both players. The solution
(
E∗, L∗
)
of the optimization problem
(P3) will be the optimal cost for both players under the agreement.
3. APPLICATION TO DUTY-CYCLED MAC
PROTOCOLS
We apply the optimization framework to three state-of-the-art energy-
delay efficient MAC protocols, X-MAC [1], DMAC [4], and LMAC [8] as
representatives of the main categories of duty-cycled MAC protocols, asyn-
chronous preamble sampling, slotted contention-based, and frame-based re-
spectively. The application to these protocols exemplify the framework and
show its usefulness to optimize different MAC parameters that permit to
achieve a fair energy-delay trade-off. The per-node energy consumption
based on the protocol operation modes, the e2e packet delay, and the bot-
tleneck constraint are provided in [3].
Energy Optimization: Given the application requirements in terms of
e2e packet delay bound Lmax, energy optimization derives optimal MAC
parameters that give the minimal network energy consumption subject to
maximum e2e packet delay. Let X∗i be the optimal point of problem (P1)
with i={XMAC,DMAC,LMAC}. Then, the optimal values of prob-
lem (P1) are Eibest= E
i(X∗i ). The corresponding e2e packet delays are
obviously non-optimal, Liworst= L
i(X∗i ).
Delay Optimization: Given the application constraints in terms of ini-
tial energy budget Ebudget, the delay optimization problems can be solved
similarly to the energy optimization models, except the fact that the largest
delay occurs at the outer ring nodes, d=D. Let Y ∗i denotes the optimal point
of problem (P2) with i={XMAC,DMAC,LMAC}. The optimal de-
lay values of problem (P2) are denoted Libest= L
i(Y ∗i ). The network
energy consumption is non-optimal for this point, and it is denoted by:
Eiworst= E
i(Y ∗i ).
Energy-Delay Tradeoff: The Nash Bargaining solution (P3) is ap-
plied in the following to the three protocols. Let the point (Eiworst, L
i
worst)
be the disagreement point1 with i={XMAC,DMAC,LMAC}. Both
1Note that although the energy is considered at nodes at ring d=1, and latency at nodes
d=D, the game is not played by the nodes, but it is played later at the system level.
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Figure 1: E-L trade-off when fixing Ebudget=0.06 J for (a) X-MAC, (b) DMAC, and (c) LMAC.
0 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.04
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Energy Consumption E [Joules]
e
2e
 P
ac
ke
t D
el
ay
 L
 [m
s]
 
 
XMAC
Tradeoff Points
Ebudget= 0.02 J
Ebudget= 0.01 J
Ebudget= 0.04, 0.05, 0.06 J
Ebudget= 0.03 J
(a)
0 0.02 0.04 0.06
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Energy Consumption E [Joules]
e
2e
 P
ac
ke
t D
el
ay
 L
 [m
s]
 
 
DMAC
Tradeoff Points
Ebudget= 0.04 J
Ebudget= 0.02 J
Ebudget= 0.06 J
Ebudget= 0.05 J
Ebudget= 0.01 J
Ebudget= 0.03 J
(b)
0 0.05 0.1 0.15 0.2 0.25
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
6000
Energy Consumption E [Joules]
e
2e
 P
ac
ke
t D
el
ay
 L
 [m
s]
 
 
LMAC
Tradeoff Points
Ebudget= 0.02 J
Ebudget= 0.06 J
Ebudget= 0.05 J
Ebudget= 0.04 J
Ebudget= 0.03 J
Ebudget= 0.01 J
(c)
Figure 2: E-L trade-off when fixing Lmax=6 s for (a) X-MAC, (b) DMAC, and (c) LMAC.
players can threat with their optimal values Eibest and L
i
best. The prob-
lem (P3) is non-linear non-convex. The authors of [11] show how to
transform similar problems into a standard convex optimization problem
without changing its solution. The idea is to define auxiliary variables E1
andL1 such thatE1=Ei(X) andL1=Li(X), which should be satisfied by
the optimal solution. Whenever the problem (P3) is feasible, Ei(X) ≤
Eiworst, L
i(X) ≤ Liworst, and application of (P3) to the MAC proto-
cols yields a concave problem (P4)with i={XMAC,DMAC,LMAC}.
(P4) Maximize log(Eiworst − E1) + log(Liworst − L1),
s.t. (Eiworst, L
i
worst) > (Ei(X), Li(X))
(E1, L1) > (Ei(X), Li(X))
s.t. (E1, L1) ≤ (Ebudget, Lmax)
V ar. E1, L1, X
Optimal values of the parameters that ensure the Nash bargaining are ob-
tained by resolving (P4) for every protocol (each with its specific formulas
of energy and latency that yields the parameters). Results are analyzed in
the following. Fig. 1.a (XMAC), Fig. 1.b (DMAC), and Fig. 1.c (LMAC)
plots the results obtained by fixing Ebudget to 0.06J , and Lmax has been
varied in [1sec, 6sec]. Fig. 2.a (XMAC). Fig. 2.b (DMAC) and Fig. 2.c
(LMAC) plots the results obtained by when fixing Lmax to 6sec and vary-
ing the Ebudget in [0.01J, 0.06J ]. As it can be observed from Fig. 1,
relaxing the e2e packet delay bound (Lmax) for every protocol leads to
an agreement in favor to the energy consumption player, while rising the
energy initial budget, Ebudget, leads to an agreement in favor to the e2e
packet delay player (as depicted in Fig. 2). As it is proved in [11], choos-
ing the pair (Eworst,Lworst) in the Nash Bargaining Solution, leads to a
solution that is proportional fair, i.e., that fulfills the following condition:
E∗ − Eworst
Ebest − Eworst
=
L∗ − Lworst
Lbest − Lworst
where (E∗, L∗) is the optimal point obtained by solving problem (P3).
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